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A. Whipple Misstates the Homeowner's and Builder's Argument 
Regarding "Prevailing Party" and "Successful Party." 
Homeowner and Builder in Fact Concede the Terms Have Been 
Used Interchangeably and are Synonymous. 
Whipple incorrectly represents that the homeowner and builder "... claim that the term 
prevailing party and successful party are mutually exclusive. ..."* The homeowner and 
builder do not now, nor have they ever maintained, that the terms "prevailing party" and 
"successful party" are mutually exclusive. What the homeowner and builder have 
continuously asserted is that in the context of a mechanics' lien case, the term "successful 
party" has, without any deviation, been interpreted by this Court to require the application 
of a legal standard that resulted in an outcome which was mutually exclusive (i.e., one was 
either successful in obtaining an order of foreclosure with respect to the mechanics' lien or 
the other party was successful in preventing the mechanics' lien claimant from obtaining an 
1
 Whipple Brief page 10. 
1 
order of foreclosure). "It will be noted that the statute confers the benefit not only on the one 
who asserts the lien but on the 'successfulparty '; in this instance the plaintiff [homeowner], 
who defended against the lien. " Palombi v. D & C Builders. 22 Utah 2d 297,452 P.2d 325, 
327-328 (1969); "^ 9 A successful party includes one who successfully enforces or defends 
against a lien action. See Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); 
Palombi v.D &C Builders, 22 Utah 2d297, 300-01, 452 P.2d 325, 327-28 (1969)." Kurth 
v. Wiarda. 991 P. 2d 1113, 1116 (Utah App. 1999). 
The homeowner and builder have never maintained that the terms "prevailing party" 
and "successful party" are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, homeowner and builder 
agree with the comments by the court of appeals in Whipple II at ^11, that the two terms 
have been used interchangeably, however, subject to an important qualification. 
Qualification: When the two terms have been used interchangeably, in the context of a 
mechanics5 lien case, they have always referred to the historical legal standard, referred to 
above (an outcome that was mutually exclusive) - not the "flexible approach" standard 
which the court of appeals in Whipple II has now substituted in place of this Court's prior 
decisions. See pages 11-12 of Appellants' Brief citing eight mechanics' lien cases. In one 
of the cases, ProMax Development v. Raile. 998 P. 2d 254 (Utah 2000) this Court uses both 
terminologies (prevailing party f2 and successful party [^12) but applied the historical 
standard. In J.V. Hatch Const.. Inc. v. Kampros. 971 P.2d 8 (Utah App. 1998) the court of 
appeals stated: "A party in a mechanics9 lien foreclosure action is not a prevailing party 
until after a determination on the merits is made by either a jury or a trial court judge." 
2 
See also text at headnotes 7 and 8 discussing lien claimant's primae facie evidence of 
entitlement to attorney fees which is met by showing that it is the "prevailing party." 
Notwithstanding, the court of appeals applied the historical standard. Both terms have been 
used interchangeably in other opinions as well. Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. 
Peebles, 48 P.3d 968 (Utah 2002); Softsolutions. Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 1 P.3d 
1095, (Utah 2000). 
The court of appeals' error was not in judicially declaring that the two terms were 
synonymous. The error was in declaring that t(our 'prevailingparty'jurisprudence" (an 
unequivocal reference to the application of their flexible approach jurisprudence) was 
controlling in the context of a mechanics' lien case. This occurred when they referred to 
their prevailing party legal analysis ("jurisprudence" as they refer to it) adopted in Mountain 
States Broadcasting Co. v. Neal 783 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1989), a contracts case involving 
"prevailing party" language, and then declared that this "flexible approach" jurisprudence 
was also controlling as to the outcome of this case, a mechanics' lien case involving a very 
specific statutory framework mandated by the legislature. The logical fallacy was committed 
in Tfl2 when after citing their Mountain States Broadcasting case (and the flexible approach 
legal analysis employed therein), they went on to implicitly overrule the prior decisions of 
this Court and replace the historical legal standard with their flexible approach - prevailing 
party jurisprudence. This was 'fait accompli" when the court of appeals stated without any 
meaningful discussion or qualification: "Finally, application of our "prevailing party" 
jurisprudence to section 38-1-18 does not detract from its objective." Whipple II, %l2. Not 
3 
only does their flexible approach jurisprudence detract from the legislative intent behind 
§3 8-1 -18, it totally negates the legislative intent and does so in a way which not only ignores 
the proper role of the judiciary viz-a-viz the legislature, but also the clear precedent of this 
Court. (This latter point is discussed more fully below.) 
Whipple states that "Aspen has not cited any case law or statute that demonstrates 
that the term 'successfulparty' or the criteria to determine 'successfulparty' is or has been 
different from the term 'prevailing party' or the criteria to determine prevailing party. "2 
Until Whipple II this statement was true. The terms were synonymous and referred to the 
same standard, i.e., the historical "successful party" standard. For proof that the standards 
are now different one has only to read the editorial notes supplied by the West editors in 
headnote eight (8). In head note eight (8), West editors provide the following summary of 
the court of appeals' opinion in Whipple II: 
[8] "A key part of the flexible approach to deciding who actually is the 
prevailing party in a mechanic's lien foreclosure action is common sense; this 
includes looking at the amounts actually sought and then balancing them 
proportionately with what was recovered." Citing Section 38-1-18 UCA1953 
as amended. A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guv, 47 P.3d 92,93 
(Utah App. 2002) 
In light of this statement, no one can seriously argue that the "flexible approach" 
standard adopted in Whipple II and the Palombi "successful party" standard are not now in 
direct conflict. Whether intentional or unintentional, the court of appeals has supplanted 
2Whipple Brief page 10. 
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their flexible approach (prevailing party) jurisprudence in place of this Court's Palombi 
jurisprudence. 
Whipple argues that "it is only by this distinction that Aspen [the homeowner and 
builder] can maintain that its paltry recovery of $527.00 in a case where total claims of 
$65,780.55 were involved, entitles it to successful party status and thus a significant award 
of attorney's fees. "3 Whipple misapprehends the homeowner'sand builder's position. First, 
homeowner and builder are not arguing for the adoption of a "net judgment" rule as 
controlling either the definition of successful party or prevailing party. Homeowner and 
builder are merely seeking to have the lower courts enforce §38-1-18 U.C.A. as enacted by 
the Utah Legislature and as historically interpreted by this Court. Second, as stated 
previously in the Appellant's Brief (page 23), "Had the homeowner and builder failed to 
recover any sum, but still prevented Whipple from obtaining an order allowing foreclosure 
of its mechanics9 lien, they would, pursuant to Section 38-1-18 UCA, be the 'successful 
party' and ergo entitled to their reasonable attorney 'sfees in obtaining this result." This 
result is what the legislature intended and what this Court has historically interpreted the 
statute to require. What Whipple fails to acknowledge is that the homeowner and the builder 
are not arguing for the creation of new law, merely the application of the historical legal 
standard. Although it may seem somewhat harsh in application, the court of appeals has no 
legitimate ground to substitute their flexible approach standard under the guise of 
3
 Whipple Brief page 11. 
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interpreting "prevailing party" in total disregard of the legislature's clear intent in this area 
of law. 
Whipple submits that "Clearly, these two terms have historically been used 
interchangeably and while heretofore this may have created some confusion, the Court of 
Appeals' ruling in Whipple II has finally clarified this issue, eliminating the potential for any 
future confusion.'* This statement is grossly inaccurate for the following reasons: First, 
prior to Whipple II there was no confusion. Second, had the court of appeals simply held 
that "prevailing party" and "successful party" were synonymous and then utilized the 
historical successful party standard (where one is either successful by obtaining a mechanics' 
lien order of foreclosure or one is successful by preventing and defending against the 
mechanics' lien foreclosure, Palombi. supra, p. 327) there would be no problem. The 
problem arises when the court of appeals substitutes their jurisprudence for that of this Court 
and the Utah Legislature. 
4
 Whipple Brief page 13. 
B. Whipple Completely Fails to Address the Stare Decisis and 
Legislative Construction Arguments Made by the Homeowner 
and Builder. 
Although Whipple's brief contains a section5 purporting to respond to homeowner's 
and builder's argument regarding the judicial presumption that the legislature is satisfied 
with the Court's construction of the statute by the subsequent enactment of the same 
statutory language, Whipple's brief avoids the argument completely. 
Based upon the doctrine of stare decisis alone, the court of appeals' decision should 
be overturned. The argument for reversing the court of appeals is irrefutable when one 
considers not only the Court's precedent, i.e., the consistent application of the "successful 
party" standard enunciated in Palombi v. D & C Builders, supra, but also the legislature's 
enactment and re-enactment of essentially the same statutory language in light of the 
doctrine of judicial cannons of statutory construction. 
The terms "prevailing party" and "successful party," cannot, without exposing the 
court of appeals to a label of being pro-active, result in any other interpretation than the 
historical "successful party" standard. By holding that §38-1-18 U.C.A. should now be 
interpreted to require a "flexible approach" in determining which party is the "successful 
party," the court of appeals is substituting their judgment for not only this Court, but that of 
the Utah Legislature. Under principles of separation of powers, it is constitutionally left to 
5Whipple Brief at page 15. 
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the legislature to change a law that is so well entrenched as this statute - particularly when 
such is done under the guise of interpreting terminology (a function constitutionally 
accorded the courts), but which is really accomplished by the court of appeals concluding, 
without any meaningful discussion, that ". . . application of our 'prevailing party' 
jurisprudence" does no1 detract from the legislative intent behind §38-1-18. The bottom 
line is they have substituted their judgment of which party in a mechanics' lien case should 
be entitled to an award of attorney fees using somewhat circuitous logic. They have 
effectively supplanted their jurisprudence for that of this Court and the heretofore mandatory 
language employed by the Utah Legislature. Whipple II rewrites and redefines the statute's 
mandatory language that "the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable 
attorneys' fee" to a result where, irrespective of which party was successful in the 
mechanics' lien case, the trial court is now obligated to apply the court of appeals' flexible 
approach jurisprudence and look to the amounts sought and then balance them 
proportionately with what was recovered. This is all accomplished under the rubric of 
holding that "successful party" and "prevailing party" are synonymous. 
This is the argument that Whipple fails to address: §38-1-18 U.C.A. was amended 
in 1961 and 1995.6 Each time the terms "successful party" and "shall be entitled" were 
6To be historically accurate, the Appellants observe that the pertinent language of 
§38-1-18 U.C.A. has not changed since 1907: 
"In any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the 
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, 
8 
retained by the legislature. By holding that the terms "successful party" and "prevailing 
party" are synonymous but then utilizing a "flexible approach" legal standard, the court of 
appeals in the guise of interpreting the two terms not only puts their decision at odds with 
or in opposition to this Court's prior decisions, in contravention to the principles of stare 
decisis, but also acts in total contravention of the judicial cannon of statutory construction. 
"... where a legislature amends a portion of a statute, but leaves other 
portions unamended, or reenacts them without change, the legislature is 
presumed to have been satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the 
unchanged portions of the statute and to have adopted them as consistent 
with its own intent." Rocky Mountain Helicoptering v. Carter, 652 P.2d 
893, 896 (Utah 1982) citing Christensen and State Insurance Fund v. 
Industrial Commission and Morrision 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982). 
If the court of appeals desires to advise the legislature that the legislative standard is 
too harsh or too restrictive, then they are free to recommend or even lobby for such a change. 
What they cannot constitutionally do is substitute their judgment under the guise of a 
function normally accorded the courts (interpreting the law) without rightfully earning the 
label of being a proactive judiciary which has no respect for the legislature's function or that 
of the separation of powers doctrine. This is precisely the type of judicial activism the Utah 
to be fixed by the court, not to exceed $25, which shall be taxed as costs 
in the action." C. L 17, §3750 (1907). 
See §3750 Compiled Law 17 (1907); §52-1-18 Revised Statutes 1933; §52-1-18 
U.C.A., 1943. The language eliminating the $25 cap was removed in 1961 by H.B.45, 
which became effective May 9, 1961. 
9 
legislature has been concerned with of late. Recently this Court stated the following with 
respect to the policy of deferring to the legislature: 
"Moreover, we urge deference to existing remedies out of respect for 
separation of powers' principles. In general, the legislative branch has the 
authority, and in many cases is better suited, to establish appropriate 
remedies for individual injuries. By requiring courts to defer to relevant 
legislative determinations of appropriate remedies, we respect the 
legislature's important role in our constitutional system of government." 
Spackman ex rel. Spackman v. Board of Educ. of Box Elder County School 
Dist.. 16 P.3d 533, 539 (Utah 2000). 
C. The Water Line was Part of the Thaynes Canyon Lien. 
During the prior two appeals Whipple never argued that the municipal water line 
relocation was not part of its Thaynes Canyon mechanics' lien claim. The trial record on this 
point is contrary to Whipple's claim. (See Transcript p. 102,1 -23; Addendum 1 [Notice of 
Mechanics' Lien claiming a lien for $30,647.20]; and Addendum 2 [trial exhibit 12 -
identifying the lien claimed with respect to Thaynes Canyon Drive was for $30,647.20].) 
Whipple filed a Notice of Claim against Thaynes Canyon in the amount of 
$30,647.20. (Addendum 1) At trial Whipple presented oral testimony which, as 
summarized on exhibit 12, identified that it was seeking recovery for work done in the total 
amount of $50,968.27. (Addendum 2) After giving credit for the $17,000.00 in payments 
made by the homeowner and the builder, Whipple claimed that the net amount due was 
$33,968.27. (Exhibit 12 - Addendum 2) This amount was broken down between three 
properties: 77 Thaynes Canyon - $30,647.20; Diane Quinn residence - $631.00; Thomas 
Guy pool house - $1,695.92. (Exhibit 12 - Addendum 2) Whipple now seeks to minimize 
10 
the amount of the Thaynes Canyon lien in order to avoid the statutory consequences of 
having filed and attempted (unsuccessfully) to foreclose the lien. Clearly the lien 
(Addendum 1) and trial exhibit 12 (Addendum 2) speak for themselves. 
Whipple was successful in obtaining an Order of Foreclosure with regards to the 
Diane Quinn and the Thomas Guy pool house liens. Whipple was not successful in 
obtaining a mechanics' lien foreclosure as to the Thaynes Canyon property, and the statutory 
consequences of such is that the homeowner and builder, as the successful party, are entitled 
to their reasonable attorney fees in obtaining this result. 
D. What are the Reasonable Attorney Fees? 
Whipple asserts that the appellants [homeowner and builder] have incorrectly 
characterized the standard of review.7 Homeowner and builder concede that the "standard 
of review on appeal of the reasonableness of a trial court's award of attorney fees is" fpatent 
error or clear abuse of discretion.1" Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998) 
(quoting City Consumer Serv.. Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234,240 (Utah 1991)); Baldwin v. 
Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1198 (Utah 1993). Faust v. KAI Technologies. Inc.. 15 P.3d 
1266,(Utah 2000). However, in this case it is not a question of the amount. If the trial court 
had determined that a specific sum was a reasonable attorneys' fee to which the homeowner 
and builder were entitled (as it did in both the Dianne Quinn and Guy pool house lien) then 
appellants would concede that they likely could not meet the burden of showing an abuse 
7
 Whipple Brief page 2 footnote 1. 
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of discretion. This, however, is not what the trial court or the court of appeals held. The trial 
court applied the wrong legal standard and the court of appeals sustained the trial court's 
decision. Interestingly, prior to Whipple II, the court of appeals explained that in the context 
of a mechanics' lien case the award of nominal fees by the trial court was an abuse of 
discretion in light of the statutory mandate provided for in §38-1-18 U.C.A., i.e. "... the 
successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys 'fee...." Govert Copier 
Painting v. Van Leeuwen. 801 P.2d 163, 174 (Utah App. 1990). 
It is respectfully suggested that in light of the statutory mandate, the award of no fees 
with regards to the Thaynes Canyon lien is also an abuse of discretion. 
Conclusion 
The application of §38-1-18 is inflexible. In this case, Whipple consciously made a 
decision to pursue a mechanics' lien, a significant portion of the work for which it was not 
licensed, i.e., the HVAC portion of the mechanics' lien. Homeowner and builder made their 
decision to fight the lien because they believed after determining the HVAC system had 
several problems, and that Whipple was not licensed, that Whipple was not entitled to 
payment for any portion of the HVAC work (a position which the court of appeals 
vindicated them in Whipple I) and consequently, that Whipple had over-liened the property. 
After a four-and-one-half day trial and two appeals, Whipple has failed to obtain an Order 
of Foreclosure with respect to that lien (Thaynes Canyon). The historical definition of 
"successful party" as adopted by this court and by the legislature under the cannon of 
12 
statutory construction (referred to previously) placed both parties on notice that whoever was 
not successful would be at risk for whatever reasonable attorneys' fee was incurred by the 
other party in resolving the matter. Whipple has zealously resisted the homeowner and 
builder at every stage of the proceedings. As a consequence it should not be surprising to 
discover that the homeowner and builder have incurred significant attorney fees at each of 
these stages. 
The homeowner and builder respectfully request that the court of appeals' decision 
be reversed and remanded with instructions to award them a reasonable attorneys' fee, 
including all fees incurred on all appeals. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 
1998) Salmon v.Davis County. 916 P.2d 890,895 (Utah 1996); Pacific Development. L.C. 
v. Orton. 982 P.2d 94, (Utah App. 1999); Social Servs. v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 
(UtahCt.App.1991). 
Because the homeowner and builder have appealed Judge Noel's decisions twice 
before, the Homeowner and Builder respectfully request that the matter be remanded to 
another district judge with instructions to conduct the necessary evidentiary hearing and 
other appropriate proceedings to conclude this case. 
13 
Respectively submitted this tap day of April, 2003 
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